He Who Controls the Silicon

Frank Herbert’s Dune gave us a universe where a single resource—the spice mélange—determined the fate of civilizations. Control the spice, control interstellar travel. Control interstellar travel, control everything. Swap spice for silicon wafers, Arrakis for Jiangsu Province, and you’ve got a decent map of what’s happening in solar manufacturing today. China doesn’t just produce solar panels. China is solar panels. The scale defies comprehension. In 2024, China added 277 gigawatts of solar capacity—roughly equivalent to building the entire installed base of the United States in a single year. By June 2025, total capacity blew past 1,100 gigawatts. In May alone, China installed 93 GW. Let that number sit for a moment. But here’s where it gets interesting. The same companies responsible for this staggering buildout are simultaneously bleeding billions. In the first half of 2025, six leading manufacturers collectively lost $2.8 billion. The world’s most successful industry is also one of its most financially distressed. Welcome to the most consequential industrial story you’re probably not following closely enough.

The Numbers

China controls 78% of global panel production, but that headline figure actually understates the situation. Dig into the supply chain and the numbers become almost comical: Polysilicon: 80%+ of global production Silicon wafers: 95%+ of global production Solar cells: 80%+ of global production Modules: 85%+ of global production The top 10 crystalline silicon module manufacturers shipped a record 500 GW in 2024—nearly double the previous year. Europe and North America each produce about 2% of global panels. That’s not competition; that’s a rounding error. The Spacing Guild didn’t need warships to maintain its monopoly. Neither does China.

The Players

Understanding where the world’s solar panels come from means knowing these names. A handful of companies control the industry’s destiny, and they’re all competing to destroy each other’s margins while building humanity’s clean energy infrastructure.

JinkoSolar

JinkoSolar sits at the top, and it’s not particularly close. The Shanghai-based giant shipped 41.84 GW of modules in just the first half of 2025, bringing lifetime deliveries past 350 GW. Their Tiger Neo series alone has exceeded 200 GW in cumulative sales—more than many countries’ entire installed capacity. Founded in 2006, JinkoSolar has topped global shipment rankings six times. Their factory in Shanxi integrates AI and cloud computing to compress the production cycle from 22 days to 7 while cutting costs by 25%. When competitors are figuring out how to survive, you’re optimizing with machine learning. That’s the gap. The Tiger Neo 3.0 modules deliver 670W output with 24.8% efficiency. A decade ago, 20% was exceptional. JinkoSolar has also hit 34.22% efficiency on perovskite/TOPCon tandem cells in the lab. Like the Bene Gesserit breeding program, some companies play the long game—and it’s paying off.

LONGi Green Energy

If JinkoSolar is the module champion, LONGi is the upstream king. Based in Xi’an, LONGi is the world’s largest manufacturer of monocrystalline silicon wafers—the fundamental building block of modern solar cells. They’re also a leading module producer, because why dominate one part of the value chain when you can dominate all of it? LONGi shipped approximately 40 GW in H1 2025, up 26% year-over-year. But here’s the strategic play: while competitors chase volume, LONGi is betting on differentiation through their HPBC 2.0 back-contact technology. By year-end 2025, they expect this premium tech to comprise over 60% of production. It’s a calculated bet that high-efficiency products can command margins when everything else is commoditized. The company has also pushed into hydrogen electrolyzers and energy storage, transforming into an integrated “solar-storage-hydrogen” solutions provider. When overcapacity hits your core business, you diversify into the rest of the energy transition.

Trina Solar

Founded in 1997—before most people could spell “photovoltaic”—Trina Solar is the elder statesman of Chinese solar. The Changzhou-based company has shipped over 205 GW lifetime and operates across 170 countries. Wood Mackenzie ranked them first among global module manufacturers for H1 2025. Trina has broken 26 world records on cell efficiency and module power. Most recently: 32.6% efficiency on an industrial perovskite/crystalline silicon tandem cell. They were also the first company certified under the Solar Stewardship Initiative’s ESG Standard—increasingly important for European buyers concerned about supply chain ethics. Manufacturing bases span Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, UAE, and until recently the United States—they sold their Texas factory in November 2025 amid scrutiny of Chinese firms and the Inflation Reduction Act. The geopolitics of solar are almost as complex as the physics.

JA Solar

JA Solar celebrated its 20th anniversary in 2025. Cumulative shipments have surpassed 280 GW across 178 countries. Annual production capacity exceeds 100 GW—yes, one company can produce more panels in a year than most regions have installed total. Their DeepBlue 5.0 modules utilize proprietary Bycium+ 5.0 n-type cells and TOPCon architecture, delivering up to 650W with 24.07% efficiency. The Yangzhou manufacturing facility—fully automated with intelligent quality control—represents what modern solar manufacturing looks like: robots building machines that harvest sunlight. JA Solar leads the Spanish market with 3 GW delivered last year and recently signed a 1 GW supply deal with UAE’s Masdar for projects in Azerbaijan. From Inner Mongolia to the Iberian Peninsula, these panels are converting photons to electrons at industrial scale.

Tongwei

Tongwei produces 450,000 tons of polysilicon per year, making it the world’s largest producer of the raw material that makes solar cells possible. If polysilicon is the spice of this industry, Tongwei controls the mining operations. But controlling upstream wasn’t enough. In August 2022, Tongwei entered module manufacturing. By 2025—just three years later—they had shipped over 100 GW cumulatively. In H1 2025, they moved 24.52 GW, up 31% year-over-year. Their Yancheng facility is the largest single-site module production base in the world. The TNC series modules have pushed mass-produced output above 700W. Tongwei invested RMB 11 billion (~$1.5 billion) in R&D over three years. Targets for 2026: up to 1 million tons of polysilicon and 130-150 GW of cell capacity. When you control the feedstock, you can afford to play long.

Austa Solar

Not every story here is about giants. Austa Solar, part of the OSDA Group based in Ningbo, represents the manufacturers that fly below the radar but move serious volume. With 10 GW of annual capacity across four domestic sites, Austa has earned Bloomberg NEF Tier 1 status—the industry’s seal of credibility. Operating since 2009, Austa has built presence in over 100 countries with offices in Germany, Netherlands, Poland, India, Brazil, and Bangladesh. They’ve evolved beyond module manufacturing into integrated energy solutions—inverters, battery storage, full project services. It’s the giants’ playbook, executed at different scale. Partnerships with Shanghai Jiao Tong University on energy storage R&D suggest Austa is thinking beyond tomorrow’s shipments. In an industry where standing still means falling behind, that matters.

The Rest of the Field

Canadian Solar wins the award for most misleading name—manufacturing is in Suzhou. But they also win something more important: profitability. In H1 2025, while competitors hemorrhaged cash, Canadian Solar posted net profit of RMB 731 million with a 29.8% gross margin. In the desert, the water-disciplined survive. Risen Energy, founded in 1986, is betting on HJT (heterojunction technology). Their Hyper-ion modules have achieved 740W output with 26.61% efficiency—numbers that seemed fantastical five years ago. GCL-SI shipped over 14 GW in H1 2025, up 40% year-over-year. Major procurement deals with state-owned giants CGN and China Resources Power keep the order book full.

The Bloodbath

Now for the plot twist: the world’s most dominant industry is destroying itself. China’s total module manufacturing capacity reached 1.8 terawatts in 2025. Global demand? About 350 gigawatts. Chinese manufacturers built capacity to produce five times what the world wants to buy. At one point, output exceeded twice the total global demand. The spice flowed too freely, and now everyone is choking on it. The results have been predictable and brutal. Polysilicon prices collapsed below production cost and stayed there for over a year. At least four major producers suspended operations. Cell segment gross margins went negative—Tongwei reported -11%. The top four manufacturers lost $1.54 billion in H1 2025. LONGi posted a net loss of RMB 2.5 billion, somehow an improvement from the RMB 5.24 billion loss in H1 2024. “We should not expect the anti-involution can be achieved in just one or two days,” Jolywood’s CEO said at a November conference. “We need to be mentally prepared for a long-term battle.” When executives reach for military metaphors, you know things are serious.

Beijing Steps In

The government that spent years encouraging solar expansion is now trying to prevent its creation from eating itself. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology has convened meetings with 14 major companies, urging them to address “low-price disorderly competition.” Translation: stop destroying each other. In December 2025, ten major polysilicon producers formed Beijing Guanghe Qiancheng Technology Co. with RMB 3 billion ($425 million) in capital. Tongwei holds 30.35%, GCL Technology 16.79%, Xinjiang Daqo 11.13%. A separate RMB 50 billion fund will retire excess capacity. Coordinated production cuts pushed polysilicon prices up 50% between July and October 2025. Whether this coordination survives contact with competitive instincts remains to be seen. The incentive to defect from cooperative agreements is powerful—just ask anyone who’s read about the Landsraad. But for now, the industry seems committed to managed retreat over mutual destruction.

The Technology Race

When everyone loses money on volume, the only escape is building something others can’t easily replicate. Hence the furious R&D spending even as losses mount. TOPCon dominates 2025, with major players achieving mass-produced efficiencies above 24%. JinkoSolar has pushed cell efficiency to 27.02%. Back Contact (BC) represents the next frontier. LONGi has built 50 GW of BC capacity and expects these products to hit half of 2026 shipments. Higher efficiency, better aesthetics, premium pricing. HJT offers another path. Risen Energy’s modules hit 26.61% efficiency and 740W output. Different manufacturing equipment creates barriers for followers. Perovskite tandems are the holy grail—stacking perovskite on silicon to break efficiency limits. JinkoSolar hit 34.22% in the lab. Commercial viability remains years away, but the prize is worth chasing.

The Geopolitical Layer

U.S. anti-dumping duties on imports from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam have scrambled supply chains. New investigations targeting India, Indonesia, and Laos continue the game of tariff whack-a-mole. The EU has launched its own investigations into Chinese PV subsidies. The uncomfortable truth: the world needs Chinese manufacturing capacity to hit climate targets, but many governments are uncomfortable with the dependency this creates. Everyone wants the spice; nobody wants to admit who controls it. How this tension resolves—through reshoring, friendshoring, or grudging acceptance—will shape energy geopolitics for decades.

The Bottom Line

In less than two decades, a handful of Chinese companies—JinkoSolar, LONGi, Trina Solar, JA Solar, Tongwei, and dozens of smaller players like Austa—have made solar power the cheapest electricity source across much of the world. They’ve shipped enough panels to generate terawatts of clean energy. They’ve pushed efficiency limits that seemed impossibly distant just years ago. They’ve also built so much capacity they’re drowning in their own success, losing billions while delivering unprecedented value to energy consumers worldwide. It’s a paradox that would make any economist reach for stronger coffee. The consolidation underway will determine which of these giants survive. Some will thrive; others will merge or disappear. But the industrial capability China has built isn’t going anywhere. When you control 95% of wafer production, you don’t participate in global markets—you are the global market. For investors, policymakers, and anyone who cares about the future of energy, these companies deserve far more attention than they receive. The decisions made in Changzhou and Xi’an and Shanghai will shape how quickly the world decarbonizes, what it costs, and who captures the value. He who controls the silicon, it turns out, controls quite a lot.